FCC v. Fox Television is not a First Amendment case. It's a First Amendment-minus case, in that while the various justices insist that it need not be decided on constitutional grounds, it nevertheless provokes one of the best First Amendment debates I have ever heard. Since the Supreme Court decided FCC v. Pacifica in 1978, which found the midday radio broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue to be indecent, the FCC rule has been this: The agency may regulate a daytime broadcast of the sort of "verbal shock treatment" of the Carlin monologue, but it will overlook the "isolated use" of one-off potty words. A 2001 clarification of the FCC policy provided that a finding of indecency requires that the naughty word "describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities" and be "patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards."
Enter Bono, who accepted his 2003 Golden Globe with the heartfelt (live) declaration that the honor was "really, really fucking brilliant." Oh. And Cher, who received her 2002 Billboard music award with the gracious, "I've also had critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every year. So fuck 'em." And the ever delightful Nicole Richie, who wowed them at the Billboard awards the following year with the observation that "it's not so fucking simple" to remove "cow shit out of a Prada purse."
The quintessential example of a claim within the core of habeas is a challenge to the validity of the prisoner‟s conviction or sentence, that is, a claim that the police, the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, the jury, or the court made a constitutional error resulting in an unlawful conviction or sentence.At this link is an article in which a whole new world of habeas seems to have been rediscovered. In which the Preiser doctrine is turned on its head for good reason. I'm also stunned to see how clearly the authors show that federal judges get it wrong, (on at least two occasions) at pp 18-19. Demonstrating splits in the circuits here is also helpful.
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A prisoner challenging the conditions of confinement, on the other hand, is permitted to bring suit under § 1983.
Before 1972, it was not clear whether sentence-administration decisions by state corrections and parole officials were subject to constitutional regulation at all. In that year, the Court held in Morrissey v. Brewer that a parolee does have a liberty interest in his continued release on parole, which cannot be revoked without due process.5 In 1974, in Wolff v. McDonnell,6 the Court extended Morrissey to decisions that deprive d inmates of good-time credits and thus delayed the date of presumptive release. Five years later in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,7 the Court recognized a liberty interest in the denial or delay of parole, if the state parole system created an entitlement to a parole hearing after a set amount of time served. In particular, the Court held in Greenholtz that a state‟s decision to deny parole must meet minimum due process standards.8 These cases made it possible for state prisoners to raise constitutional challenges to sentence-administration decisions that had previously been unregulated by federal law.Here are several of the more controversial statements, with which I tend to agree wholeheartedly, to be viewed critically by a trained eye:
And on the recent Death Penalty case, via Doug (I could not have said it better):Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of Thomas Goldstein, an ex-marine who was convicted of murdering his neighbor.
Goldstein served 24 years before his conviction was thrown out when the main witness against him was shown to have lied. That witness was a lifelong criminal who was given a deal on his own charges in exchange for testimony that Goldstein confessed to him in a jail cell. Goldstein alleges that the district attorney's office that prosecuted the case routinely used the testimony of so-called "jailhouse snitches" prosecutors knew or should have known weren't reliable.
Goldstein's case is unusual because he's not suing the prosecutor who convicted him, but John Van de Camp, the district attorney who supervised that prosecutor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has allowed Goldstein's case to go forward, causing the U.S. Supreme Court to agree to hear it.
Goldstein's lawsuit stems from federal law 42 U.S.C. 1983, which states that "…[e]very person" who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional rights shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages," and provides a means for those wronged by government officials to file suit in federal court.
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We tend to measure a prosecutor's performance based on how many people he's able to throw in jail, not necessarily by how well he metes out justice.
Rarely, for example, does a prosecutor get public recognition for the cases he doesn't take. So we have people in a position where they have the enormous power to take away someone's freedom, incentives nudging them to err on the side of prosecuting aggressively, and absolute immunity from lawsuits should they overstep their bounds.
It's a recipe for abuse.
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The New York-based Innocence Project reports that prosecutorial misconduct played a role in about 40 percent of DNA exonerations over the last decade or so. Such misconduct could include knowingly putting on false testimony, withholding exculpatory evidence from defense attorneys, and coercing witnesses, among other transgressions.
I recently reported a case in reason magazine quite similar to the Goldstein case. In 2006, Church Point, Louisiana resident Ann Colomb, 57, and her three sons were wrongly convicted in federal court of running a massive drug operation out of their home, thanks largely to the testimony of several jailhouse informants.
Despite the fact that the family's home was modest, and that the sons held down several hard labor jobs and went to school during the years of the alleged conspiracy, the government witnesses — who were offered time off from their own sentences in exchange for their testimony — claimed to have cumulatively sold the family some $500,000 worth of crack each month.
The family was released from prison when it was revealed that the jailhouse witnesses in the case had participated in an information sharing network within the federal prison system. Inmates were sharing photos, case summaries, and even grand jury testimony about pending cases, memorizing the information, then offering to testify in exchange for breaks on their own prison terms.
Edward Lazarus has this new piece at FindLaw, titled "Five Decades of Fighting Over the Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: What Can We Learn from This Lengthy War?". Here is how it starts:
These days, when one speaks of a "war without end," the reference is usually to Iraq. But in the legal world, the phrase also provides an apt description of the five-decade-long fight over the constitutionality of the death penalty.
Last week's decision in Baze v. Rees, in which the Court rejected a challenge to Kentucky's three-drug protocol for carrying out lethal injections, is just the latest painful yet inconclusive battle. Like the Court's many dozens of death penalty decisions, issued over the last 45 years, the decision in Baze ensures only that the larger war will continue and that the Court's own internal culture will continue to be one of its casualties.
a policy of denying appointed counsel to arrestees released from jail on bond and by failing to adequately train and monitor those involved in the appointment-of-counsel process.This is at the core of Rothgery v. Gillespie County, (scotusblogwiki) to be argued today in the Supreme Court. My prediction is that plaintiff Rothgery wins, case returns to the District Court for further proceedings.
the summary judgment evidence fails to establish that adversary judicial proceedings had been initiated against Rothgery during his magistrate appearance.Here is my question, getting technical, if as the court says the affidavit was filed only to establish pc for arrest and not to initiate charges, if the hearing was not an "arraignment" which concededly triggers the right to counsel, why would Rothgery need to be held on bail? Why would he need a Miranda warning? Didn't Mirandization trigger the right to counsel all by itself?
The Short Skinny on Wallace v. Kato from Scotusblog and a longer piece by Kent (Crime and Consequences), here:
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority. There were two Justices in partial dissent. The case was Wallace v. Kato (05-1240, download here). In that case, the statute of limitations for filing a civil rights claim was two years, under Illinois law.
The false arrest claim in the civil rights lawsuit by Andre Wallace of Chicago had its origin, the Court ruled, when he appeared before a magistrate after his arrest and was bound over for trial. More than two years elapsed between that date and the day he filed his lawsuit, and thus, the Court decided, the lawsuit was too late.
The Scalia opinion was supported by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and by Justices Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the result only, along with Justice David H. Souter. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
The Texas style system allows for too much disparity, and does so by preserving unfettered discretion. This opens the door to too much liklihood of abuse(s) of that discretion.
The discretion must be bounded by some rules, aka guidelines, that are objectively reasonable and barring the "objective"(ness), at least reasonable to a reviewing court. Defendants, and the public held accountable to the laws, must know to a reasonable certainty what they are facing when they take a case to trial, vis a vis taking the plea. This mechanism or aim achieves the "uniformity" sought (which is impossible to achieve but a thing to seek after nevertheless). Obviously too much uniformity is something that needs to be avoided equally as much as too much discretion.
I would just add, after reviewing transcripts, that a presumption of reasonableness would not be the best way to handle this. De novo reasonableness review enables the courts to preserve the desired discretion, and avoids giving the appearance that district decisions would be presumptively upheld.
Also, that avoids the incongruous conclusion, or appearance of a conclusion, that the district court's findings of facts are given a presumption, where those findings were actually in the nature of "legal" conclusions derived from interpretation(s) of the guidelines. That is really what must be left up to reviewing courts to decide, de novo of course, as a matter of law. [Major Mori]
The oral argument transcripts for Rita are now available online. On a quick first read, something interesting jumped out at me. Justice Scalia seems to be constructing an argument that a specialized form of Sixth Amendment violation happens when appellate courts review sentences: [SLP, Ron Wright]
The Supreme Court ruled on Wednesday that an individual filing a civil rights lawsuit claiming a false arrest by police must sue within a time period that begins to run at the time of detention, not after any resulting conviction or sentence has been overturned. This requires plaintiffs to file considerably earlier than they would have preferred, and perhaps before their claim has matured or been strengthened through a successful appeal of a conviction.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority. There were two Justices in partial dissent. The case was Wallace v. Kato (05-1240, download here). In that case, the statute of limitations for filing a civil rights claim was two years, under Illinois law. [SCOTUSblog]
